A z-Tree Course


5: A Public Goods Game



Matteo Ploner
Università degli Studi di Trento

A Public Goods Game


A Public Goods Game


  • Participants can decide how much contribute to a "public" project out of their endowment
  • Participants are in a group of N subjects (usually 4)
    • What is contributed is multiplied by an efficiency factor $1/N<\alpha<1 $
    • What is not contributed is kept in a private account
  • Private incentives are to contribute nothing to the public account
  • But, contributions are efficient
    • $\Rightarrow$ social dilemma
  • The interaction is repeated T times in a partner fashion

Preliminaries


Contribution Stage


Stage Paytoffs


Stage Payoffs (ii)


Stage Payoffs (iii)


History


Final Payoff


Assignment


  1. Take the PGG
    1. Replicate it as it is, but with groups of 5 participants
    2. Create a new experiment that has the same structural features of the PGG but differs in the way data are collected
      • 2 Participants
      • One chooses (Pl.1) an integer between 0 and 10
      • The other (Pl.2) chooses an integer between 0 and 10, for each potential integer chosen by the other
      • Choice of the other
        012345678910
        Your choice
      • The choices of the two in the group are then matched and payoffs computed
        • As an example, if Pl.1 chooses 3, and Pl.2 had chosen 2 in correspondence to 3, the total contribution is 5